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With the current pace of digital innovation, corporations and startups alike are experiencing the challenge of surviving 
in hypercompetitive environments. Accordingly, the management literature proposes “organizational ambidexterity”, the 
ability to balance exploitative and exploratory efforts, as a means of survival. Based on observations and interviews with 
startups and investors affiliated with the entrepreneurial educational program SCALEit, this study investigates how 
startups can manage ambidexterity in pursuing digital innovation. Our study concludes that startups conducting digital 
innovation manage to attain organizational ambidexterity through internal and external adaptation by combining and 
enacting competencies. The startups have access to a competency portfolio that comprises eight core competencies 
across organizational boundaries. The startup CEO, team members, and individuals in the ecosystem that surround the 
startup provide these competencies, which reveals a new perspective on how to achieve organizational ambidexterity 
through leveraging both internal and external competencies. 
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1 Introduction 
Since passing the 50th anniversary of Moore’s law, we have, according to Fichman, Dos Santos, and Zheng 
(2014), entered the golden age of digital innovation. They define digital innovation as “a product, process, 
or business model that is perceived as new, requires some significant changes on the part of adopters, and 
is embodied in, or enabled by, IT” (p. 330). Yoffie (1996) anticipated the rising pace of digital innovation and 
described it in terms of “digital convergence”. This digital convergence has caused previously separate 
functions in individual digital technologies to unify and intertwine, which has led to a major disruption of 
global business. Indeed, a report from Innosight (2012) highlights the fact that global business has changed 
in documenting that the turnover of companies on Standard and Poor’s 500 Index has significantly increased 
from an expected average of 61 years in 1958 to only 18 years in 2012. 
D’Aveni (1998) describes how industries such as consumer electronics, telecommunications, and computer 
industries have changed “to environments, characterized by intense and rapid competitive moves, in which 
competitors strike quickly with unexpected, unconventional means of competing" (D’Aveni, 1998: 183). To 
describe this new market situation, D’Aveni (1998) introduced the term “hypercompetition” as a contrast to 
previously where “firms sought to sustain a competitive advantage, seen as the ‘holy grail’ of strategy” (p. 
183). An organization previously simply had to sustain competitive advantages to ensure its survival. 
However, the need to continuously generate new competitive advantages defines the hypercompetitive 
market we see today (D’Aveni, 1998). Therefore, being a large and successful company at one point in time 
does not guarantee that it will continue to prosper (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008) since established companies 
experience difficulties in rearranging their resources quickly enough to sustain competitive advantages 
(Freeman & Engel, 2007). Freeman and Engel (2007) offer the struggle among established corporations as 
one reason to explain how a window in time opens and allows innovators such as startups to gain a 
temporary advantage (Freeman & Engel, 2007). In this regard, Freeman and Engel (2007) emphasize that, 
over the last 50 years, the number of technology-based startups has grown due to the fact that they have 
created the competencies to leverage changes in technology and their affiliated market disruptions and, 
thus, brought “new products to market relatively quickly, while their larger but slower corporate competitors 
[have] lag[ged] behind” (Freeman & Engel, 2007, p. 95). Consequently, the digital age has fostered a rise 
of startups acting as front-runners in digital innovation (Fichman et al., 2014; Yoffie, 1996). Such startups 
engage in digital innovation through a business model embodied or enabled by IT (Fichman et al., 2014). 
In general, we can define a startup as an organization “searching for a repeatable and scalable business 
model" (Blank & Dorf, 2012, p. 39) where the business model describes how the organization creates, 
delivers, and captures value. Therefore, a startup does not have the same established business processes 
as a corporation and typically has less capital and fewer employees and strategic alliances (Freeman & 
Engel, 2007). 
To sustain competitive advantage in hypercompetitive environments, the management literature has 
highlighted that companies need to excel at ambidextrous behavior, which encompasses the paradoxical 
ability to simultaneously exploit existing competencies through short-term optimization and explore new 
opportunities through long-term innovation (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Du, Pan, & Zuo, 2013; O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 2008; Smith & Tushman, 2005). The majority of existing research on ambidexterity has neglected 
startups as an interesting unit of analysis (Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling & Veiga, 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 
2008) with some notable exceptions (Beckman, 2006; Kuckertz, Kohtamäki, & Körber, 2010; Mueller, 
Volery, & von Siemens, 2012; Parida, Lahti, & Wincent, 2016; Volery, Mueller, & von Siemens, 2015). 
Particularly, research has overlooked the unique characteristics and required competencies of startups that 
engage in digital innovation. As a process, we can conceptualize digital innovation as “the carrying out of 
new combinations of digital and physical components to produce novel products” (Yoo, Henfridsson, & 
Lyytinen, 2010a, p. 725). These new combinations are enabled by digital technology, which, through its 
affordances, support an environment of openness and flexibility in creating innovations characterized by 
convergence and generativity (Yoo, Boland, Lyytinen, & Majchrzak, 2012). Such innovations transform the 
“socio-technical structures that were previously mediated by non-digital artifacts or relationships into ones 
that are mediated by digitized artifacts and relationships” (Yoo, Lyytinen, Boland, & Berente, 2010b, p. 6). 
In fact, the literature emphasizes that digital innovation uniquely differs from other types of innovation. 
Startups that focus on developing new products and services in the digital domain require new 
competencies compared to startups that work in other domains. Thus, Herterich and Mikusz (2016) stress 
that “digital innovation goes beyond traditional product functionality of the physical artifact and traditional 
mechanisms in innovation literature” (p. 1). The generativity associated with digital technology changes the 
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industrial landscape, and “traditional theories that provide guidance for strategic management of modular 
innovation can no longer offer effective guidance in a world of generative digitized artifacts” (Herterich & 
Mikusz, 2016, p. 15), which leads to a call for future research studies that provide guidance on digital 
innovation, including the competencies needed. Therefore, startups pursuing digital innovation—as 
opposed to other types of innovation—represent a highly relevant unit of analysis and the focal point of this 
paper. As a theoretical lens, digital innovation draws on socio-materiality to allow for new ways to interpret 
innovations in the digital realm. We extend state-of-the-art knowledge on ambidexterity in startups by 
focusing on the particular challenges (e.g., the high dependency on business networks) in combining digital 
and physical components in developing new service and product innovations. As such, we formulate the 
following research question (RQ): 
RQ:  How can startups pursuing digital innovation manage ambidexterity? 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on organizational ambidexterity with 
specific emphasis on startups’ state-of-the-art knowledge. In Section 3, we describe our research approach 
to study startups in the context of the entrepreneurial accelerator program “SCALEit”. In Section 4, we 
present our findings in terms of key competencies in startups pursuing digital innovation. In Section 5, we 
reflect on our findings and theorize how startups enact competencies to balance exploitation and exploration 
and, thus, manage ambidexterity. In Section 6, we discuss how startups pursuing digital innovation can 
manage ambidexterity by comparing our findings to extant literature. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the 
paper. 
2 Organizational Ambidexterity 
To define ambidexterity, we follow Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) who define it as “an organization's ability 
to be aligned and efficient in its management of today's business demands while simultaneously being 
adaptive to changes in the environment” (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008, p. 375). Ambidexterity requires 
companies to overcome the paradox of the two contradictory knowledge-processing activities exploitation 
and exploration (He & Wong 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Smith & Tushman, 
2005). Exploitation involves a short-term, top-down learning process that leverages the routines and actions 
best suited for using existing knowledge and competencies. As such, exploitative activities focus on using 
a company’s existing strengths (Lubatkin et al., 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Conversely, exploration 
involves a long-term, bottom-up learning process that embraces experiments and variation in pursuing 
innovation and that sometimes threatens the existing organizational setup and products (Lubatkin et al., 
2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). Because these fundamentally different logics compete for the same 
scarce resources, companies experience tensions between the two (Lubatkin et al., 2006). When balancing 
these competing activities, prior research suggests that companies risk following their natural tendency to 
prioritize either eploration or exploitation, which research refers to as the “competency trap” and the “failure 
trap”, respectively (Lubatkin et al., 2006; Smith & Tushman, 2005). Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008, p. 377) 
highlight that “too much exploration may enhance a firm's ability to renew its knowledge base but can trap 
organizations in an endless cycle of search and unrewarding change”. On the other hand, too much 
exploitation will “enable immediate profits, but foster eventual stagnation, leaving firms vulnerable to market 
and technological changes” (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009, p. 697). 
Overall, the ambidexterity literature outlines three different approaches to managing the balance between 
exploitation and exploration (Lubatkin et al., 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). One approach, known as 
“structural ambidexterity”, describes how organizations can achieve ambidexterity through separating their 
efforts to focus on either exploitative or explorative activities (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). In practice, they 
do so through either “task partitioning” (in which they delegate the different activities to different business 
units or work groups) or through “temporal separation” (in which they schedule the two contradictory tasks 
at different periods) (Adler, Goldoftas & Levine, 1999; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Andriopoulos & Lewis, 
2009). 
Rather than achieving ambidexterity through a predetermined structural separation of exploitation or 
exploration, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) introduce the concept of “contextual ambidexterity”. Contextual 
ambidexterity describes “the behavioral capacity to simultaneously demonstrate alignment and adaptability 
across an entire business unit” (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 209). With contextual ambidexterity, the 
balancing of exploitation and exploration depends on the ability of an organization's individuals to generate 
the proper balance themselves. Rather than having implemented formal structures that separate exploitative 
and exploratory activities, organizations achieve contextual ambidexterity through a supportive 
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organizational context that shapes rather than dictates individuals’ ability “to judge for themselves how to 
best divide their time between the conflicting demands for exploitation and exploration” (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 391). Therefore, contextual ambidexterity describes how ambidextrous individuals 
achieve organizational ambidexterity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Inspired by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994), 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) suggest that the interplay of four behavior-framing attributes—stretch, 
discipline, support, and trust—form such facilitating contexts and that organizations must balance the 
performance-management elements (discipline and stretch) with the social context elements (support and 
trust) in order to achieve the right supportive context (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 
2008). Additionally, a strong organizational culture, decentralization, supportive and flexible leadership, and 
socialization and team-building practices constitute facilitating factors (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; 
Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). 
Finally, the third approach to ambidexterity, called “leadership-based ambidexterity”, covers the pivotal role 
of a company’s top management team in achieving ambidexterity (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Smith & 
Tushman, 2005). Lubatkin et al. (2006), for example, describe how behaviorally integrated top management 
teams with a high degree of cohesion and joint decision making have a positive effect on organizational 
ambidexterity. However, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) and Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) describe that 
the contextual approach is a higher-order concept, which also spans the mechanisms of leadership-based 
ambidexterity. 
2.1 Examining Ambidexterity in Startups 
Researchers in the ambidexterity field have debated not only how companies can manage the balance 
between exploitation and exploration but also how to measure the extent to which organizations are 
ambidextrous (Lubatkin et al., 2006; He & Wong, 2004). However, rather than focusing on the extent to 
which startups are ambidextrous, we examine how startups manage to perform exploitative and explorative 
activities simultaneously and, thus, attain organizational ambidexterity. Several studies have contributed to 
clarifying the process of achieving ambidexterity in one or several organizations (Adler et al. 1999; 
Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong 2004; Smith & Tushman, 2005) 
However, with some notable exceptions (Beckman, 2006; Brem, 2017; Kuckertz et al., 2010; Mueller et al., 
2012; Parida et al., 2016; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Volery et al., 2015), most studies have examined 
ambidexterity in large and well-established companies. For example, Lubatkin et al. (2006) analyzed the 
causality between ambidexterity and performance in small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across 
different industries. Beckman (2006) investigated team composition and members’ prior affiliations as 
antecedents of exploration, exploitation, and organizational ambidexterity and concluded that shared 
understandings from common prior company affiliations support exploitative behavior, whereas the diversity 
associated with different prior company affiliations encourages explorative behavior. Kuckertz et al. (2010) 
studied German-funded technology-oriented startups and concluded that both explorative and exploitative 
behavior are positively associated with innovation project success and firm performance. Brem (2017) 
argued that startups need to be ambidextrous “in a unique way, as they have very limited resources in all 
relevant areas: they need to come up with product ideas, ways of distribution, problem solving, etc., and at 
the same time they have to take care of legal issues, writing invoices, answering emails, etc.” (p. 267). 
However, existing studies do not reveal how startups manage simultaneously to be creative in terms of 
exploration and efficient in terms of exploitation. We address this research gap in this paper. Mueller et al. 
(2012) investigated the everyday behavior of six entrepreneurs in the startup stage. Among other things, 
they looked into the time the entrepreneurs allocated to exploration and exploitation activities. They called 
for more empirical studies and asserted that it is both “theoretically and practically relevant to examine the 
nature of the entrepreneurs’ behavior” with regard to “the processes of discovery, evaluation and exploitation 
of opportunities; and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate, and exploit them” (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000, in Mueller et al., 2012, p. 1003). According to Parida et al. (2016, p. 1158), 
“ambidexterity is achievable in young entrepreneurial firms, it might be very challenging to create a 
combinatory mindset within the firm”. Thus, we need more research on how to resolve these challenges. 
Volery et al. (2015) observed entrepreneurs and identified behavioral patterns that allowed them, their team, 
or the organization to pursue ambidexterity, but, contrary to their claims, they did not identify the 
competencies that enabled these behaviors and patterns. Cragg, Caldeira, and Ward (2011) presented a 
framework of organizational IS competencies in SMEs that comprised 22 IS competencies organized around 
six macro competencies. However, although the framework unites previous frameworks and typologies of 
IS resources and competencies, the competencies refer to specific abilities at the organizational rather than 
the individual level. Thus, we lack state-of-the-art knowledge about the individual-level competencies that 
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startups require for ambidextrous behavior. Furthermore, despite these valuable contributions, we know 
about no research that has investigated ambidexterity in startups pursuing digital innovation. 
To investigate how startups manage ambidexterity, we need to understand the nature of the explorative and 
exploitative activities they perform. As we state above, startups constitute companies searching for a 
repeatable and scalable business model (Blank & Dorf, 2012). Thus, explorative activities include 
performing experiments to achieve a product/market fit, engaging with users to explore new revenue 
streams, searching for capital and funding, acquiring knowledge of new technologies, and innovating 
products and business processes (Volery et al., 2015). On the contrary, exploitation in a startup includes 
the performance of daily operations, administration, accounting, system maintenance, repeated sales to 
existing customers, incremental product development, and overall efficiency improvements (Volery et al., 
2015). 
In examining ambidexterity in SMEs, Lubatkin et al. (2006) emphasize that SMEs lack the option of 
managing ambidexterity through structurally separating activities because they lack organizational 
structures and have limited resources. We argue that startups have similar organizational constraints and, 
therefore, lack the option of structural ambidexterity. Having eliminated the structural option, Lubatkin et al. 
(2006) examine ambidexterity in SMEs by studying the facilitating role of top management teams. In this 
regard, we argue that startups are too small and undefined to contain an actual top management level and, 
therefore, also lack the option of leadership-based ambidexterity. Accordingly, based on the three general 
approaches to ambidexterity that the literature outlines (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008), startups only have the 
option of attaining ambidexterity through the contextual approach according to which they create a context 
that allows individuals in the startup to judge for themselves how to divide their time between exploitative 
and explorative activities (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Startups are “embryonic” organizations (i.e., 
organizations in the making). As such, it makes sense to focus on the activities of individuals that make up 
these organizations at their earliest developmental stages. 
When examining what makes an individual ambidextrous, Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, and Tushman (2009) 
suggest exploring the individual's personal characteristics including their competencies and further 
emphasize that one should consider personal characteristics alongside the organizational context that 
supports ambidextrous behavior. Assessing the competencies that individuals use in startups pursuing 
digital innovation would imply mapping the competencies in an information systems (IS) and innovation 
management context. Several studies quoted in the IS and innovation literature have used Feeny and 
Willcocks’ (1998a, 1998b) framework to map and examine the impact of IS competencies on process 
innovation, firm performance, and new product development (Pavlou & Sawy, 2006; Preppard & Ward, 
2004; Ravichandran & Lertwongsatien, 2005; Tarafdar & Gordon, 2007). Consequently, we draw on Feeny 
and Willcocks’ (1998a, 1998b) studies in which they develop nine core IS capabilities to define the term 
competency. They define a competency as “a generic unit of ability such as ‘analytical thinking’, ‘self-
control’, or ‘results orientation’” (Feeny & Willcocks, 1998a, p. 16). One can attribute this focus on the 
individual to the conceptualization of competency in psychology as “an organism's capacity to interact 
effectively with its environment” (White, 1959, p. 297). Feeny and Willcocks (1998b) further elaborate that 
such competencies imply a set of individual behaviors, personalities, and skills. The way we use the word 
competency aligns with that the way that the management literature often uses it: as “an underlying 
character of a person in that it may be a motive, trait, skill, aspect of one's self-image or social role, or a 
body of knowledge which he or she uses” (Boyatzis, 1982, p. 21). Our distinction between competency and 
competency portfolio resembles that of Stratman and Roth (2002) who define and operationalize the 
concept of ERP competence “as a portfolio of managerial, technical and organizational skills and expertise” 
(Stratman & Roth, 2002, p. 602). In Table 1, we list definitions of key concepts we use in this paper. 
Peppard and Ward (2004), using the framework of Feeny and Willcocks (1998a), describe how 
competencies are embedded in and linked to organizational processes and routines. Thus, “a competence 
is an emergent property of organizational processes” (Peppard & Ward, 2004, p. 180), and the manifestation 
of one competency depends on the context and task at hand. Therefore, by nature, a competency is neutral 
and cannot be defined as either exploitative or explorative. Instead, enacting a competency in performing a 
particular task in a specific context determines whether it is exploitative or explorative (Volery et al., 2015). 
Accordingly, examining ambidexterity in startups implies an integrated analysis that covers the 
competencies of the individuals in startups and the context that facilitates individuals’ actions. 
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Table 1. Definitions of Key Concepts 
Concept Definition 
Competency 
Generic unit of ability constituted by a set of individual behaviors, personalities, and skills 
(Boyatzis, 1982; Feeny & Willcocks, 1998a, 1998b). 
Key competency 
A competency that must be available either inside the startup or externally through 
stakeholders in order to perform core business activities (adapted from Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990). 
Competency portfolio A bundle of key competencies that the startup can access (Stratman & Roth, 2002). 
Competency enactment The process of putting competencies to use (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Role Formal task responsibility in the organization (Krantz & Maltz, 1997). 
Resource Stocks of available factors that the startup owns or controls (Peppard & Ward, 2004). 
Task 
A unit of activity that is either explorative or exploitative depending on purpose and 
context (Volery et al., 2015). 
Startup team member An individual who is part of the startup team. 
External stakeholder An individual or organization outside the startup. 
3 Research Design 
Previous research of contextual ambidexterity primarily relies on quantitative studies (Du et al., 2013). 
However, our research question, which focuses on how startups manage ambidexterity in pursuing digital 
innovation, leans itself toward a qualitative case study since case studies constitute the most appropriate 
foundation for answering “how” questions (Huang & Kim, 2013). Furthermore, Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) 
emphasize the need for detailed case studies to further substantiate our knowledge about contextual 
ambidexterity at an individual level of analysis, and we focus on doing so by examining the competencies 
that individuals that constitute startups need. Therefore, we contribute a qualitative multiple case study that 
examines contextual ambidexterity in startups to the ambidexterity literature (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Specifically, we examined seven startups that participated in the SCALEit accelerator program (see below). 
However, we did not focus on SCALEit itself in our investigation. Rather, SCALEit served as the context of 
our investigation and provided us with access to the startups. Thus, our study corresponds to a holistic, 
multiple case study rather than an embedded case study (Yin, 2009). Our research builds on extensive 
interviews across seven startups and three startup investors and on field observations of a group of 
entrepreneurs that participated in SCALEit, which focuses on helping Danish entrepreneurs scale and 
accelerate their business in the United States (US). We organized our qualitative study based on Miles and 
Huberman's (1994) recommendations regarding instrumentation, data collection, data analysis, and data 
display. 
3.1 The Analytical Framework 
As we state above, in this paper, we assess the combination of competencies that startups pursuing digital 
innovation require to attain ambidexterity. Accordingly, we chose to base our study of competencies in 
startups on the research framework that Feeny and Willcocks (1998a, 1998b) present. We chose Fenny 
and Willcocks’ (1998a) nine core IS capabilities framework for several reasons. First, it has received a high 
number of citations (1200+ citations according to Google Scholar at the time of writing) across many different 
IS studies. Second, the framework pertains to our research since it draws attention to competencies “needed 
to facilitate the exploitation of IT, measurable in terms of IT activities supported, and resulting business 
performance” (Willcocks & Feeny, 2006, p. 49). In their work, Feeny and Willcocks (1998a, 1998b) examine 
the multiple competencies and skill sets that enable organizations to successfully manage the supply and 
demand for IS/IT services. In doing so, they present a framework that taps into three streams of research 
that explores the core IS competencies that IT organizations need. The first research stream explores CIOs’ 
competencies, which, in the startup context, corresponds to CEOs’ role, persona, and experiences. As such, 
we chose to interview all CEOs from the seven startups that participated in our study. The second stream 
investigates in-house competencies, which, in the startup context, corresponds to the competencies in each 
startup. Furthermore, the second stream explores the development and access to those competencies, 
profiles the individuals that deliver them, and, thereby explores the context in which organizations leverage 
the competencies (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Thus, we examined these competencies in our study. Lastly, 
the third research stream investigates outsourced IS/IT competencies, which, in the startup context, 
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corresponds to startups’ experience with both insourcing and outsourcing. Thus, we examined startups’ 
experience in assessing their internal competencies versus the competencies that external parties possess. 
Consequently, by following Feeny and Willcocks’ (1998a, 1998b) framework, we conducted an integrated 
study that covered both the individuals’ competencies and the context that shaped their actions. 
3.2 Case Description 
We conducted our observations and interviews during a one-week accelerator program called SCALEit that 
targets Danish entrepreneurs who work with digital innovation (SCALEit, 2015). The Innovation Centre 
Denmark in Silicon Valley (a branch of the Danish Government founded as a partnership between the 
Ministry of Higher Education and Science and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark) conducts the SCALEit 
program. Innovation Centre Denmark offers several services that help Danish companies to “navigate in 
disruptive markets and technologies by connecting [them] to world-class knowledge institutions, investors 
and partners” (Innovation Centre Denmark, 2015). As part of its services, Innovation Centre Denmark runs 
the SCALEit program as a growth initiative that helps Danish technology companies scale globally “by 
offering a unique opportunity to interact with the high-speed and innovative Silicon Valley ecosystem” 
(Nielsen, 2017). The program targets Danish entrepreneurs who wish to gain inspiration and learn how to 
scale and accelerate their startups using Silicon Valley as a point of entry. Through Innovation Centre 
Denmark, we gained access to participate in an entire SCALEit program and, thus, to observe the program 
and the four participating startups. Furthermore, by following the SCALEit program, we came into contact 
with three additional startups and three startup investors. In addition to our SCALEit observations, we 
conducted interviews with the seven startups and three startup investors. 
We examined startups that participated in the SCALEit program since they focused on scaling their business 
internationally and considered themselves as global businesses pursuing digital innovation in 
hypercompetitive markets. Accordingly, these startups experienced the challenges that we present in 
Section 1, which means that they needed to master ambidexterity to ensure they survive in the global 
market. All startups that participated in this study worked with digital innovation in the sense that they had 
a business model embodied by IT. They primarily offered software products, although some also involved 
hardware elements. The startups relied on a mixture of business-to-consumer and business-to-business 
business models. We found no correlation between hardware or software products and business model in 
the startups, and they had different ages (from one to four years). Additionally, some of the startups 
generated revenue and some did not. However, they had all launched a product or service and wanted to 
upscale their startup to a global business. The seven startups in this study focused on a wide variety of 
digital technologies (see Table 2 for an overview): 1) an app that connects people who need assistance with 
volunteer helpers, 2) a smart and connected toy that uses data to assess cognitive development, 3) an app-
connected moneybox for educational purposes, 4) an app that connects and facilitates social events 
between people, 5) a Web platform that brings freelancers and clients together, 6) a cloud-based product 
information-management system, and 7) a blood-analysis device for improving women’s health. The three 
investors interviewed in this study had different characteristics: one was a venture capitalist, one a partner 
in a startup accelerator, and the last an angel investor. The concentration of venture capital, angel investors, 
and startup accelerators in Silicon Valley is higher than anywhere else in the world, and Silicon Valley 
currently accounts for more than 40 percent of venture capital invested in the US (CBInsights, 2015), which 
makes its ecosystem a favorable environment for startups that seek funding to scale their business. 
3.3 Data Collection 
We gathered data over a three-month period. Our primary data comprised observations and ten semi-
structured interviews that each lasted approximately one hour and all followed the same interview guide 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). We conducted interviews with three investors and seven digital innovation 
startups. See Table 2 for an overview of the participating informants and their respective roles. Additionally, 
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Table 1. Informant Overview 
Informant Company product / service Roles 
1 An app that connects people who need assistance with volunteer helpers CEO 
2 A smart and connected toy that uses data to assess cognitive development CEO 
3 An app-connected moneybox for educational purposes CEO, CIO, CMO 
4 An app that connects and facilitates social events between people CEO 
5 A Web platform that brings freelancers and clients together CEO 
6 A cloud-based product information management system CEO, CTO 
7 A blood-analysis device for improving women’s health CTO 
8 Venture capitalist Partner 
9 Startup accelerator 
Partner and 
investor 
10 Angel investment company Angel investor 
Furthermore, we conducted 30 hours of descriptive observation not to answer a particular question but 
rather to try to understand “what’s going on here?” (Spradley, 1980). Spradley (1980), with his ethnographic 
approach to descriptive observations as a way of identifying the features of a phenomenon in a social 
setting, served as inspiration for this effort, which resulted in our using his “grand tour observations” and 
“mini-tour observations” (Spradley, 1980). Specifically, we first observed the overall context that comprised 
our field of observation (i.e., the one-week SCALEit program) and then focused more narrowly on the 
startups. In other words, we compiled the bigger picture (i.e., the grand tour) by observing the SCALEit 
program from which we obtained valuable background information that we used as a foundation to narrow 
examine the individual startups (i.e., the mini tour). The grand tour information included: 
• Introduction to the Silicon Valley ecosystem 
• Practice of pitching business concepts with feedback from a pitching professional 
• Multiple pitch sessions with potential investors and partners 
• Lessons learned from other Danish entrepreneurs who have established and scaled their startup 
in the USA 
• Networking with other international entrepreneurs, and 
• Legal counseling. 
Synthesizing the insights from the grand and mini-tour observations, we gained a priori knowledge that we 
used in creating the interview guide. Furthermore, the observational data served as a foundation for 
comparing and validating the informants’ statements in the interviews. 
We wrote up the raw field notes from our observations and recorded and transcribed the interviews. 
Subsequently, we coded each data entity separately using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
3.4 Data Analysis 
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe how working with empirical data implies that one needs to thoroughly 
consider how collects, analyzes, and displays it. Drawing on our comprehensive transcription and 
comparison of the interviews and the field notes from the observations, we began an iterative coding process 
that comprised three main iterations in which we analyzed and synthesized both theory and our qualitative 
data. 
3.4.1 Stage One: Identifying Initial Categories in the Literature 
By searching the Scopus and Web of Science citation databases for relevant literature using keywords 
associated with ambidexterity and innovation, we gained a foundation for understanding the subject area of 
ambidexterity as a basis for defining key competencies in startups pursuing digital innovation. We followed 
a similar approach to Stratman and Roth (2002) who, by identifying theoretically important competency 
constructs, defined and operationalized ERP competence. The literature search yielded papers that we 
subsequently categorized according to themes (e.g., exploitation, exploration, and structural ambidexterity). 
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As a result, we identified 40 categories across all papers. Subsequently, we evaluated papers’ relevance 
by relating the categories (i.e., the themes) to our research question, which resulted in our merging some 
categories and discarding other since they lacked relevance to our study. In the end, we included papers 
across 20 categories that spanned key themes related to ambidexterity and innovation. As a result, we 
came to better understand the ambidexterity literature (i.e., we developed priori knowledge), which 
influenced how we collected our empirical data. In addition, we performed a similar search for literature that 
covered competency theory and, as we mention above, selected Feeny and Willcocks’ framework (1998a, 
1998b) as the basis for our research and competency definition. 
3.4.2 Stage Two: Identifying Initial Categories in the Empirical Data 
We loaded all transcribed interviews and write-ups of observational data into NVivo for separate data 
analysis before we conducted a more holistic analysis in which we searched for patterns across the data 
set. We followed Miles and Huberman (1994) in carrying out “first-level coding” on each data entity by 
categorizing data based on themes that appeared naturally in the data. This coding process resulted in a 
total of 165 data categories, such as personality traits, collaboration process, investor collaboration, pitching, 
technical tasks, and prioritization of tasks. 
3.4.3 Stage Three: Coding the Empirical Data Using the Literature 
After stage two, we performed “pattern coding” in which we related the categories to themes and concepts 
that we defined in stage one. As Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend, we followed an iterative process 
to pattern coding whereby we related the categories to themes and concepts as we collected and, 
subsequently, analyzed data. Consequently, the categorization of the ambidexterity literature provided 
guidance for the pattern coding in the sense that we organized our data around the themes in the literature 
(e.g., we grouped data that matched the attributes of the facilitating organizational context). We followed 
the same process to categorize the data according to the competency literature, which influenced how we 
grouped data around personality traits, skills, and types of tasks that we found in our interviews and 
observations. Finally, the pattern coding followed Feeny and Willcocks’ (1998a, 1998b) research framework; 
as a result, we generated the categories of CEO, startup team, and Silicon Valley ecosystem that contained 
data that described the individuals that corresponded to these three categories. In total, our pattern coding 
resulted in our reducing the number of categories from 165 to five (i.e., competencies, CEO, startup team, 
Silicon Valley ecosystem, and context). Table 3 provides an overview of the final categories and 
corresponding numbers of subcategories. We further decompose some of the subcategories in Table 3 into 
an additional level of subcategories, which explains why the number of subcategories in the table does not 
total 165. 
Table 3. Data Categories and Subcategories 
Category Subcategories 
Competencies 
Thirty-three subcategories (e.g., “design tasks”, “impulsive”, “technical tasks”, and 
“energetic”). 
CEO Two subcategories (“CEO tasks” and “CEO role”). 
Startup team 
Six subcategories (e.g., “establishing the team”, “hiring team members”, and “team 
composition”). 
Silicon Valley ecosystem Eight subcategories (e.g., “investors”, “external advisors”, and “SCALEit”). 
Context 
Twenty-two subcategories (e.g., “decision-making process”, “company culture”, and 
“trust”). 
4 Key Competencies in Startups 
Through the three data-analysis stages that we mention above, we identified eight key competencies (digital 
product development, enterprising, envisioning, business orchestration, commercialization, networking, 
empowerment, and perseverance) in startups pursuing digital innovation. In line with Stratman and Roth 
(2002) who define and operationalize ERP competence, the eight key competencies identified constitute a 
competency portfolio through which startups can achieve ambidexterity by enacting the competencies to 
perform explorative and exploitative tasks (Volery et al., 2015). Figure 1 illustrates the competencies, and 
we describe them below in terms of the behavior, personality traits, and skills that they entail (Feeny & 
Willcocks, 1998b). 
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After presenting the eight competencies, we map the combination of competencies that the CEO, the startup 
team members, and external stakeholders in the startup ecosystem of Silicon Valley enacted. In practice, 
this process involves enacting a competency portfolio that crosses organizational boundaries. 
 
Figure 1. Key Competencies in Startups 
4.1 Digital Product Development 
The ability to transform a vision into an actual digital product represents the essence of the digital product 
develop competency. As we mention in Section 3.2, all the startups we examined had a software element. 
Therefore, for these startups, building an actual product meant that they required individuals who had 
mastered programming to develop the software as one team member highlighted: “If you are creating an IT 
company, one of the team members has to be a programmer”. Building hardware components is also an 
expression of the digital product development competency even though it implies different behaviors and 
concerns as one team member stressed: “Hardware is different from software. It is much more complex, 
and you also have to consider supply chain and stuff like that.”. Furthermore, the competency of digital 
product development also entails the concerns of product design (i.e., concerns related to “design thinking, 
design abnormity, design ethnography, and user-centered design” as one CEO noted). Thus, digital product 
development requires both technical and managerial skills (e.g., a programmer’s and a designer’s or 
architect’s skills). Another startup team member explained how behavior related to the competency of 
transforming the vision into an actual product also implies coordination and collaboration: 
I have technical insight, and I am able to scope, that is describe a solution to a development team, 
do prizing, and start and manage a production as well as ensure that they do what they are 
supposed to do, at the right price, at the right time, and with the right quality. That is basically 
what I am good at. 
Startups pursuing digital innovation need to build the product and make technology work since invention 
and creation are necessary but not sufficient prerequisites for innovation. As one CEO emphasized: 
The value is in the product, or, as long as you have a good idea, and that product/market fit works, 
then it’s all about the product. And you have to build it; otherwise you will not receive any feedback 
telling you if you are doing the right thing. 
The individuals who embody the digital product development competency have a natural inclination or urge 
to design and create. They enjoy solving technical challenges and the feedback they receive when building 
yet another part of the product as one startup team member explained: “Sometimes I forget to consider our 
guidelines and visions, because I just want to create the coolest thing that can ever be done”. Finally, this 
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quote also exemplifies how the digital product development competency entails immersion into the details 
and intricacies of the scrutinized subject area. 
4.2 Enterprising 
Another key competency in startups pursuing digital innovation concerns the ability to execute any task and 
get things done. Consequently, we call this competency enterprising. This competency entails the 
personality trait of having a “frenetic energy level” as one investor called it. For example, one team member 
explained: “The journey from thought to action is short. I do not have a need to sit down, think and analyze. 
If it makes sense, I will do it right away.”. This energetic behavior constitutes an essential element in the 
enterprising competency. One CEO noted: “So it is probably a curse, but I don’t like sitting on my hands” 
and “I will never sit back and relax, never”. 
Startups have no time for hesitation due to their scarce resources, which makes enterprising an important 
competency for them. We observed individuals who displayed this competency as self-reliant problem 
solvers who possessed discernment and decisiveness. For example, one investor said: “But I have always 
been of the view that if there is a problem, it will get solved—and I will get it done. And that has always been 
that way.”. Thus, enterprising often involves the courage to take on tasks in unknown areas of expertise. 
One startup team member explained: 
We face hurdles all the time and face things that we do not know anything about. Then it is just 
about figuring it out as quickly as possible, and then move on. We cannot hire anyone to figure it 
out for us, so it is just the hard way. The fun way! You learn a lot from that. 
This quote also demonstrates how the enterprising competency implies an iterative learning-by-doing work 
process whereby individuals acquire new knowledge and skills on an ad hoc basis. As one investor said: 
“My background is completely self-taught, I dropped out of high school and out of college. And I basically 
taught myself marketing because I had a business I wanted to grow and I didn't have any money”. Further, 
one CEO explained: “We first figured out all of those things afterwards. We should have known it from the 
beginning. We did not. We were just in execution-mode. So, we had to say—we need to go back and get 
the basics straight.” 
The energetic behavior and learning-by-doing approach to problem solving that the enterprising competency 
implies enables startups to pivot and adapt their business in searching for a scalable and repeatable 
business model. 
4.3 Envisioning 
Startups pursuing digital innovation need the envisioning competency in order to create new and original 
concepts and, thus, develop new products and services. This competency entails a never-ending stream of 
ideas on how to improve, optimize, and create new products and services and, as one CEO explained: “At 
the end of the day, it is just about solving problems, or identifying problems and being able to execute it 
right”. However, our research shows that this competency is linked to the entrepreneur's desire to inspire 
people and make the world a better or smarter place. As an example, one team member described the 
purpose of their innovation: “You know, it is something that would improve [users’] life quality”. Indeed, an 
investor backed this thought in explaining the vision of a CEO in a startup he recently invested in: “He is 
doing this because he believes that he can help a lot of people around the world”. Additionally, one investor 
defined passion as an important trait of the envisioning competency: 
It's like you are passionate because of life experience or you have worked somewhere and had 
a pain point, like this sucks and I have built a whole business around it. I don't want people to go 
through what I went through when I was doing that in my last company. 
Furthermore, our observations show that envisioning entails the skills creativity and design thinking and 
involves looking at the big picture and avoiding too many details. Likewise, it entails idealism that future 
goals and benefits drive as one team member explained: “You know, you have that dream in front of you. 
We just have to reach that point, we just need to do this and that.”. Finally, individuals who display the 
envisioning competency are independent, take risks, and embrace the unorthodox and unexplored in 
generating concepts. Indeed, a CEO indicated as much in explaining that: “Through a personality test, I 
became aware of how little I respect rules and standards”. 
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4.4 Business Orchestration 
Business orchestration concerns executing day-to-day activities and managing business processes. Thus, 
metaphorically speaking, business orchestration involves making the wheels turn and ensuring a solid 
foundation for doing business. Hence, according to one CEO, individuals require this competency in 
performing traditional finance-related tasks such as “making financial models, reading financial statements, 
making statistics, and understanding numbers and financial structure in general”. Furthermore, startups 
need to secure a stable cash flow to build a sustainable business foundation as another CEO stressed: “I 
know exactly when our money will run out, and based on that I know that if I am not getting some [money] 
before that, then we will run out, and then we won't have a secure foundation”. Therefore, fundraising, 
including talking to investors and attending investor meetings, also represents an example of enacting the 
business orchestration competency. Moreover, business orchestration involves handling legal concerns 
regarding ownership, patents, how to move the company onto the global business scene, and so on. As 
one team member noted, individuals who excel at business orchestration are skilled at “structuring things, 
making time schedules, meeting deadlines, and ensuring progress of a process”. In summary, enacting the 
business orchestration competency involves a wide variety of tasks—from mitigating risks to designing 
business processes. 
4.5 Commercialization 
While the digital product development competency embeds the ability to transform a vision into an actual 
product, the commercialization competency involves transforming an idea for a product or service into a 
business opportunity. In turn, doing so requires communicating the value of the product or service to 
customers. Thus, commercialization relates to marketing and PR. However, one investor highlighted how 
he saw the marketing trait of the commercialization competency only in 50 percent of digital startups even 
though it is key to successfully commercializing products or services of startups: “We do like to see people 
that understand marketing, but I would say that it's less than half”. Moreover, the investor emphasized 
marketing’s value in noting that he actively sought to teach the startups he invested in marketing if they did 
not possess this skill from the outset. Enacting the commercialization competency requires skills associated 
with being a “people person”. As one CEO explained: 
I am good...at reading the situation. Quickly assessing what angle you might have on all this. 
What game you are playing, and how I can either play along or make you think that I do, thus 
making you believe that this is happening with the best intentions in mind. 
Accordingly, a personality trait of the commercialization competency involves the ability to tailor 
communication about a product to a given sales situation, which implies the ability to perceive and 
understand how to best approach stakeholders when having to achieve an intended outcome. 
4.6 Networking 
As with the commercialization competency, startups who have individuals with traits associated with an 
outgoing personality allow the startups to leverage the network competency. Therefore, the characteristics 
of the networking competency focus on three activities: meeting, sharing, and recalling. Meeting other 
people and learning from them represent an essential part of the competency. This willingness to learn from 
others relates to the realization of one’s own limitations and lack of knowledge as a basis for actively 
searching for insight and input from others. As one team member explained: “If there is something technical 
that I need an answer to..., then I will ask some über-technical person who I, of course, have in my network”. 
The networking competency entails an actively engagement with connections in the existing network as one 
CEO described: “Every time we make a decision we have a lot of insights internally in the founding team, 
but we also ask our advisory network afterwards to get other interesting in-sights and inputs”. Networking 
concerns knowing who in the network to turn to for help in order to solve immediate problems or address 
current issues based on past experiences and relevant knowledge. 
Startups leverage networking for not only learning purposes but also giving back. This competency is 
typically found in conjunction with an attentive personality such that it tends to make other people that a 
networking person connects with or encounters feel at ease sharing their activities and potential problems 
because they believe that the networker has their best interest in mind and wants to help them in any 
possible way. An investor expressed the fact that this competency also implies the intention to help others 
in the network in the following quote: “When the CEO said: ‘Oh, I’ll need a marketing person’, then I say: 
‘Oh, I know just the person’. ‘Oh, I need a VP of engineering’, and then I say: ‘Yup, I know that person too’.”. 
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Accordingly, the networking competency features the ability to recall people that one has previously 
encountered who could offer a solution to the expressed challenges. Consequently, a good memory and 
the ability to think in patterns also represent personality traits associated with this competency. 
4.7 Empowerment 
A startup requires the empowerment competency to use and realize the full potential of its scarce human 
resources. One CEO described how to encourage team members to share their potential challenges in 
saying that he would ask them “What do you need, how can I help so that you can do your work better?” so 
that they could proactively deal with any issues and not endanger the progress of establishing a scalable 
and repeatable business model. The empowerment competency concerns not only proactive but also 
reactive problem solving. For instance, one team member explained how he assisted other startup team 
members by introducing them to individuals in his network if they needed help solving a problem that they 
could not solve themselves. 
Furthermore, the empowerment competency entails the ability to appreciate joint decision making and work 
delegation and, thus, to let other team members be in charge. As one CEO explained: “We sort out the 
objectives [together], what we want to obtain, and what is important..., and then we decide on an abstract 
level. But from there people themselves are in charge of executing.”. This competency includes not only the 
ability to delegate but also the virtue of trust. The CEO continued: “If there is anyone taking the lead, then I 
trust them to do it. I do not have a need to control.”. Additionally, delegating work and trusting fellow 
members with responsibility reveals a trait of respect for others and their proficiencies as an element of the 
empowerment competency. 
4.8 Perseverance 
Both entrepreneurs and investors highlighted persistence as a key competency in startups. One investor 
explained: “The thing that I try to look for is that tenacity. ...You know the view that you are not going to lose. 
Whatever it takes you are going to win.”. Therefore, we can explain this conviction of future success as a 
paramount belief not in a specific product or idea but in the ability to make the startup work—to find 
something that will ultimately work because one has a passion for doing so. Another investor outlined why 
startups need individuals with the perseverance competency: 
The truth of the matter is that, in startups, ...you have to pivot. So, let’s say you guys start a 
company and a year goes by, and this looks really tough. You could say, ‘you know, we give up. 
...This is not going to happen.’. But if you guys are tenacious and tough, you are going to say: 
‘Yeah, this didn't work out, but you know what—we are going to get it done’. 
Consequently, perseverance allows a startup to search for a repeatable and scalable business model. 
Experiencing challenges and setbacks is an inevitable part of startup life, but the perseverance competency 
determines how startups react to setbacks. One CEO described how his startup team tried to proactively 
cope with obstacles: “There is nothing that we sit around waiting for. We always have something to fall back 
on if the answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no’. We never depend on only one thing.”. Despite mastering the competency of 
perseverance, one CEO explained that he understandably felt down having invested a lot of time in a project 
that turned out badly, but that he gets over it after a short while. Another startup team member explains: 
You live with an indomitable belief that you can make it work, and that you will never give up. 
Believing that makes you able to handle setbacks with a shrug: Oh, you know that is quite funny, 
or that will maybe become a funny story one day, or I think that I am just going to forget that. 
Consequently, the optimistic personality trait constitutes a fundamental aspect of the perseverance 
competency. Table 4 summarizes the eight key competencies we identified in our study. 
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Table 4. Key Competencies in Ambidexterity 
Competency Ability to 
Digital product development Transform a vision or an idea into an actual product 
Enterprising Perform any task that presents itself and handle challenges 
Envisioning Create new and original concepts 
Business orchestration Execute day-to-day activities and design business processes 
Commercialization Transform a product or service into a business opportunity 
Networking 
Connect, make an impression, and create relationships with external 
stakeholders 
Empowerment Utilize and realize the full potential of the scarce resources available in the startup 
Perseverance Keep working despite obstacles 
4.9 Competencies of the CEO 
Throughout this study, CEOs showed themselves to be generalists in that they took care of a wide variety 
of tasks in their startups. As one CEO noted: “I am really a jack of all trades. I have done sales, I have done 
marketing, I have been programming, I have been presenting, and I have been writing applications.”. 
However, the interviews highlighted three main tasks that the CEOs performed, which one informant 
summarized as: “Making sure that we do not run out of money, hiring amazing people, who are more 
talented than me, and then for the rest of it staying out of their work and really giving them the freedom to 
conduct it.”. 
While startups often use bootstrapping (i.e., self-financing) as a financial model, they eventually need to 
obtain external funding to continue their work on finding a product/market fit. Our research shows that a 
startup’s CEO deals with the challenge of attracting capital, which typically takes place through pitching the 
business idea to potential investors. From observing the SCALEit program, we found that the act of pitching 
relies on enacting the business orchestration, networking, envisioning, and enterprising competencies. In 
pitching, startups leverage the business orchestration competency to present the financial opportunities 
related to the future of the business and to describe the state of the startup through extensive insight into 
company metrics. Furthermore, one interviewed investor explained that investors often have their preferred 
business areas that they invest in. Thus, the networking competency ensures startups can establish contact 
to potential interested investors. One investor explained how pitching also relies on the envisioning 
competency since investors consider passion a more reliable foundation for establishing a business than 
just wanting to earn money. The investor explained it as follows: 
It's like you are passionate because of life experience or you’ve worked some-where and had a 
pain point like: ‘This sucks and I've built a whole business around it’. ‘I don't want people to go 
through what I went through when I was doing that in my last company’. So, those are better 
approaches to come at. 
Moreover, a CEO described how an unsuccessful meeting with an investor made him realize that his startup 
team lacked knowledge about business fundamentals: “That was a wake-up call—that maybe we had to go 
home and do some studying”. This way of dealing with setbacks reveals the CEO enacted the perseverance 
and enterprising competencies since he practiced learning by doing and, at the same time, behaved 
optimistically with regard to accepting and learning the things he did not know. 
Both CEOs and investors described how startups often hired new team members based on 
recommendations from the network, which again emphasizes the essential networking competency. Hiring 
the wrong people can devastate startups due to their scarce resources. One investor highlighted the fact 
that hiring focuses on mitigating risks: 
You sort of like hire slow, fire fast. You take a lot of time to get to know someone. I love ‘try before 
you buy’. If we’re going to work together, I'm going to hire you as a consultant for three months 
and I’m going to get to know you in those three months before I make a full-time offer. 
Therefore, being able to evaluate whether or not a new hire could valuably extend a startup’s team involves 
the envisioning and enterprising competencies. 
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Our research shows that CEOs enacted the empowerment competency to realize the full potential of their 
team members. One CEO explained: “When I came into the team there they were blown away that they had 
freedom to create, but you know that's the whole point of startups! You empower people to create something 
that you don’t know.”. Another CEO who stressed that he simply had no time for micro-management further 
noted that he motivated team members to make choices for themselves. Moreover, the startup CEOs’ 
enacting the empowerment competency implied a joint decision-making process: “We have the rule, that 
the one with the best arguments gets to decide. Sometimes it comes to a deadlock with the ‘I want’ and ‘I 
want’. But I think that we are good at deciding things together.”. Another CEO explained how joint decision 
making through frequent debates actually enabled a startup to appear carefully thought out: 
As a startup you are constantly challenged on your direction, your models, and your vision. ...So, 
when we have been de-bating, then we also have the arguments supporting the decision that we 
ended up making, due to the fact that we have already discussed it. 
4.10 Competencies of Startup Team Members 
When examining the team members that constituted the startups that we examined, we explored the 
combination of in-house competencies that the team members enacted. One CEO described the minimum 
in-house competencies that a startup needs as follows: “At a minimum, the startups must be able to build 
the product themselves, and at a minimum they must consist of one outgoing person who's able to talk to 
people”. Our research shows that all startups displayed this in-house access to the digital product 
development and networking competencies. The need for these two particular competencies relates to the 
fact that startups that deal with digital innovation focus on searching for a product/market fit. One investor 
explained: “If the product is not good enough and it doesn’t fit, then there’s nothing. In my world, it’s really 
a myth that you can sell bad software if you just work hard enough.”. Consequently, by iteratively building 
their product and receiving feedback from talking to potential customers, the startups in our study developed 
and adapted their business. In addition to digital product development and networking, the startups needed 
the enterprising competency since achieving the right product/market fit involves quickly testing ideas and 
prototypes. While the CEOs displayed the business orchestration competency, the team members in charge 
of marketing, PR, and product sales displayed the commercialization competency. However, some of the 
startups in our study completely lacked the commercialization competency in house due to either 
outsourcing or their struggle with achieving a product/market fit, which meant they were not yet ready to 
market their product. 
Furthermore, the startup team members differed from the CEOs in the sense that they were professional 
specialists who often excelled in just one skill (e.g., a particular programming language, user experience, or 
online marketing). One CEO explained the need for hiring specialists as follows: We don't need another 
generalist…because that is two chiefs trying to do the same thing”. We found a clear division of work and 
responsibility between these specialists that constituted the startups. As one team member highlighted: “We 
have a clear division of responsibility”. One CEO further said: 
I have the responsibility for legal [matters] in our business, and thus I have to figure that out. Now 
we have a thing about owner agreements, which is also legal stuff, and we know nothing about 
that. Therefore, I will have to ask our network. But it is my responsibility to present some material, 
and then together we can all say: “Alright, let's do that”. 
Therefore, this division of work and responsibility between team members implies that they needed the 
networking and enterprising competencies in order to access the knowledge and competencies of 
individuals outside the startup. Doing whatever it takes to fulfill the delegated responsibility implies a certain 
amount of self-discipline. One team member explained: “You cannot say: ‘I don’t know’. Then you will have 
to figure it out.”. 
A well-functioning startup team involves than just a mix of individuals who contribute with their expert skills. 
Because the area of digital innovation implies high uncertainty and rapid change, the startups needed to 
build an “A-team” that displayed the perseverance competency, appreciated the value of constant learning, 
kept up the spirit, and never gave up. The startups considered having an “A team” as more valuable than 
having an excellent idea since they can change the idea and acquire new professional skills along the way. 
However, as one CEO claimed: “An A-team does not build itself if people don’t have the capability”. 
Therefore, when building the startup team, we see that startups searched for employees who possessed 
the same sort of passion and drive that initially made the founders create the business. As one CEO 
stressed: “You are not supposed to be here for the money. Instead you need to have that passion that 
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everyone’s talking about.”. Another CEO agreed: “The most important thing is to employ people who 
understand and accept our vision”. As such, the envisioning competency plays a vital role in ensuring a 
startup acquires the necessary team members. The expectation that startup team members should enact 
the envisioning competency also relates to an implicit expectation that they should be ambitious and, thus, 
emphasizes the importance of the enterprising and perseverance competencies. Indeed, one CEO said: 
“The more we are able to push each other and really find out what is counting, the better we can become”. 
Finally, both CEOs and investors emphasized the importance of getting along and having a strong company 
culture. One CEO stated: 
One thing is how good the product will become, another thing is the journey. I have seen in my 
last company, what a bad company culture can do to you. It can really be fatal. ...So, it is very 
important that we fit together at a personal level. 
Another CEO described how hanging out with potential candidates, spending an afternoon watching a 
football match with them, or doing some other similar activity with them provided one way to assess their 
personality fit before hiring them. Finally, one investor described the chemistry as follows: “It should be like 
a happy marriage, where you can complete each other’s sentences, and you are obviously in harmony”. 
Accordingly, chemistry and cohesion among a startup’s team members represent important factors in 
helping the startup to succeed due to the extensive time they spend together. 
4.11 Competencies in the Startup Ecosystem 
In examining the combination of internal and external competencies that startups dealing with digital 
innovation enacted, we found that individuals in the surrounding ecosystem of Silicon Valley provided 
several such competencies. First of all, startups need to have an advisory board as one of the experts during 
the SCALEit program emphasized: “You need an advisory board for two reasons. You need new knowledge 
to supplement what you already know, and you need to prove to potential investors that you are aware of 
your own limitations and are willing to learn.”. Therefore, the startups in our study either had an advisory 
board or had begun to build one. 
Moreover, when startups raise the first round of money in exchange for equity, they gain access to the 
extensive knowledge and competencies of their investors. One investor explained: 
Startups are really high risk. How are you going to reduce the risk? You do the same thing in 
parenting. Which is you give help. ...So, if we invested in you, there is literally nothing I would not 
do to help you guys succeed.  
This form of help spans from just giving advice to contributing to actual work tasks to even temporarily 
working in the startup. The same investor elaborated: 
I'll be at your board meetings; I’ll give you my thoughts etcetera. Help you get co-investors into 
your deal. That is the very minimum. But going forward, you know, we have had portfolio 
companies saying: ‘You know, we are a bunch of engineers, we need to write some marketing 
copy, and none of us writes very well. Can you write it, because you understand what we are 
doing?’. So, I have written that. 
Accordingly, this quote expresses how the investor contributed to the startup with the commercialization 
competency, which enabled it to articulate its product in writing, and the networking competency, which 
enabled the startup to gain more investments. Another investor explained how he contributes with the 
business orchestration competency as follows: 
I spent last week together with one startup CEO and made a financial model.... So, we sit down 
for one day and think it through—if this is our goals for 2016 and 2017, who do we need to hire, 
in what pace, and what does it cost? 
Lastly, an investor shared that: “I have actually stepped into our companies and been there for extended 
periods of time and done the job. So, the longest time I did was for two years. I was the CEO of one of our 
companies.”. Therefore, even people outside a startup can provide and enact the empowerment 
competency. 
In addition, we found that startups gained access to knowledge and competencies from people in Silicon 
Valley’s ecosystem not necessarily through being one of their investors or advisors but simply just through 
being a mentor or a person they meet. We observed how this willingness to share and provide knowledge 
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to others—the “pay-it-forward” culture—characterized the Silicon Valley ecosystem and manifested itself in 
open-minded, helpful individuals who willingly made an effort on behalf of others without expecting any 
direct payoff. One CEO described his experiences as follows: “It is just, you know—can I do something to 
help you improve? And that is very epoch-making, ...and it has just been a snowball effect ever since.”. 
Hence, the pay-it-forward culture highlights the importance of the networking competency and enables 
startups to gain access to external competencies. At the same time, Silicon Valley’s ecosystem attracts 
well-educated and talented entrepreneurs, and investors use these entrepreneurs’ abilities to generate 
concrete results and attract referrals as key screening criteria. One investor explained: “The only way for us 
to tell whether you are a good entrepreneur or a bad entrepreneur is if someone says: ‘You know, she is a 
very good entrepreneur’.”. This quote implies that the Silicon Valley ecosystem expects entrepreneurs to be 
ambitious and self-disciplined, which highlights the importance the perseverance and envisioning 
competencies. 
According to our findings, individuals outside the startups we examined sometimes provided the eight key 
competencies that the startups enacted, which illustrates that the startups had access to a portfolio of 
competencies that the CEO, startup team members, and individuals in the ecosystem possessed. The 
startups needed both management (e.g., business orchestration) and development (e.g., digital product 
development) competencies, but they could reside both in and outside their bounds. Consequently, a startup 
could, for example, source digital product development to one or more individuals in the ecosystem as long 
as the CEO or the startup team members could acquire, integrate, and enact competences from external 
parties. Thus, who exactly enacted competencies depends on the specific situation and the work task at 
hand as the above examples convey. 
As an example, Figure 2 illustrates the portfolio of competencies in one of the startups across the CEO, 
startup team members, and individuals in the ecosystem. 
 
Figure 2. Example Competency Portfolio of Startup 
5 Ambidexterity in Startups 
In this section, we reflect on the competency findings that we present by applying insights and perspectives 
from the ambidexterity literature. In doing so, we theoretically assess the relationship between how startups 
enact competencies, how they balance exploitation and exploration, and the context that facilitates this 
balance. 
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5.1 The Ambidextrous Startup 
Our findings show that CEOs—as head of startup teams—often quickly assess tasks that confront the team 
and then assigns them to team members, including themselves, in order for them to perform the tasks 
according to urgency and impact. For example, as one CEO explained: 
We are developing the product and I have made a plan together with the boys saying what they 
are supposed to work on for the next four to five weeks, and then there is marketing, and that's it. 
But how much money would I be able to raise back home contra here in Silicon Valley? I believe 
that the chances are greater here, so I left [to attend the SCALEit program]. 
Hence, this quote expresses an example of the balancing act between the explorative activity of developing 
the product and the exploitative activity of raising money. The CEO elaborated: “In general, we have a rule 
saying that everyone helps where it is most important. ...Even if I end up having to clean the floor so the 
other guys can code, then that is what it takes.”. Consequently, in accordance with Gupta, Smith, and 
Shalley’s (2006, p. 693) definition of ambidexterity as “the synchronous pursuit of both exploration and 
exploitation via loosely coupled and differentiated subunits or individuals, each of which specializes in either 
exploration or exploitation”, the startups pursuing digital innovation managed to act ambidextrously at an 
organizational level via orchestrating how they enacted competencies. This orchestration has a certain 
similarity to what Smith and Tushman (2005) define as the “leader-centric” model of integrating contradictory 
agendas, which implies that the CEO acts as an organizational integrator by aligning and orchestrating the 
efforts of startup team members and individuals outside the startup who provide any necessary missing 
competencies. However, the other startup members act in a similar capacity, which evidences contextual 
ambidexterity rather than leadership-based ambidexterity. To illustrate, one CEO described how he 
connected startup team members with individuals in the Silicon Valley ecosystem: “So, we touch base once 
in a while and I say: ‘What do you need? I made contact to this guy; I can facilitate the contact to you.’. 
…So, I hook them up and make an email introduction, and then he [the startup team member] handles it 
from there.”. 
Moreover, our findings show that CEOs not only contribute to striking an overall balance between 
exploration and exploitation but also self-administer the time they spend on exploitative and explorative 
tasks. One CEO explained: 
I know exactly when our money will run out, and based on that I know that if I am not getting some 
[money] before that, then we will run out, and then we won't have a secure foundation. So, when 
it is getting urgent, I will dedicate myself a 100% to that. 
Consequently, as the need for obtaining money becomes urgent, CEOs shift attention from running the 
startup each day (for which they enact the business orchestration and empowerment competencies) to 
focusing on the future need for funds (for which they enact the business orchestration, networking, 
envisioning, and enterprising competencies). CEOs’ ability to judge for themselves how to divide the time 
between exploitation and exploration expressed in the quote above indicates that one can define startup 
CEOs as ambidextrous individuals (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). As we mention in Section 4.9, the startup 
CEOs we examined were generalists and often displayed all or most of the key competencies, which 
enabled them to enact these competencies in different ways and perform both exploitative and explorative 
tasks.  
In contrast to the tenets of the “leader-centric” model (Smith & Tushman, 2005), the CEO does not represent 
the only ambidextrous individual in a startup who orchestrates how startup members and external individuals 
enact competencies. Our research shows that all startup team members balanced their activities between 
exploitation and exploration. For example, one startup team member claimed: “I'm responsible within two 
areas. One is the production of the digital product. And then innovation as a whole, so implementing new 
technologies.”. Therefore, this startup team member was responsible for exploitative activities (e.g., 
ensuring the product’s physical production and, thus, enacting the digital product development and 
enterprising competencies) and explorative activities (e.g., scouting for new technologies and possible ways 
to build the product and, thus, enacting the networking, digital product development, envisioning, and 
enterprising competencies). Another startup team member described being responsible for marketing (e.g., 
executing daily marketing tasks and exploring new marketing tools and opportunities). Accordingly, in 
startups, team members need to perform both explorative and exploitative tasks and to balance the two. As 
a result, we can characterize startup team members we examined also as ambidextrous individuals (Gibson 
& Birkinshaw, 2004). As the above examples illustrate, individuals use the same competencies for both 
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explorative and exploitative tasks. As such, our findings resemble Peppard and Ward’s (2004) finding that 
how startup team members express a competency depends on the context. 
Our findings also suggest that startup team members also assess when and how to access the knowledge 
and competencies of individuals outside the startup. Consequently, individual startup team members’ 
judging how to balance their effort between exploitation and exploration also implies that they need to 
assess when and how to enact the competencies of individuals outside the startup. Achieving ambidexterity 
in this way in the startup resembles Smith and Tushman’s (2005) “team-centric model”. The team-centric 
model describes how team members coordinate and balance their contradictory tasks themselves by 
embracing conflict and possessing roles and responsibilities at different levels (Smith & Tushman, 2005), 
which relates to the context that facilitates their actions, which we discuss in Section 5.2. 
5.2 The Facilitating Context 
As we mention in Section 4 the startups prioritized chemistry and cohesion when hiring new startup team 
members, which created the foundation for a facilitating social context (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). One 
startup team member highlighted how trust constitutes an important facilitating factor: “It is merely a question 
of informing the others rather than asking them for permission”. Moreover, in acting the empowerment 
competency, which implies joint decision making, startup team members foster a trusting environment in 
which they coordinate and integrate their knowledge and balance their activities individually. One team 
member explained: 
If I sense that what the other team members are working on is important to my connection and 
understanding of the project as a whole, then I simply just have to ask them for an update and 
gain the knowledge I need to know what is going on. 
Therefore, the democratic leadership style associated with the empowerment competency facilitates the 
team-centric way of achieving ambidexterity (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Smith & Tushman, 2005). In 
addition, our findings demonstrate that the facilitating social context closely relates to Silicon Valley’s pay-
it-forward cultural characteristic since it implies a trusting and supportive mindset. We found this mindset 
among the startup team members we examined since, according to one CEO, they undertook “different 
roles in order to help and support each other”. Thus, one can ascribe the supportive culture in startups to 
the CEOs and startup teams enacting the empowerment competency, which suggests that startup CEOs 
and team members all play important roles in achieving ambidexterity (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Gibson 
& Birkinshaw, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006). 
As we mention in Section 4, team members obtain new knowledge and skills themselves, reach out to their 
network when performing their tasks, and do whatever it takes to achieve their goals. Accordingly, our 
research demonstrates how startup team members stretch themselves in order to fulfill their delegated 
responsibilities and make an actual impact. Silicon Valley’s ecosystem, which features an expectation of 
ambition and self-discipline and differentiates entrepreneurs by their results and referrals, amplifies this 
performance management culture and, thus, emphasizes the enterprising competency. Therefore, the 
startup context entails both stretch and discipline and resembles the understanding of Gibson and 
Birkinshaw (2004) who claim that startups achieve contextual ambidexterity through a balance between the 
social context and performance management elements. 
To summarize, the context of the startups dealing with digital innovation entails an open-minded, helpful, 
and trusting culture, which simultaneously involves high ambition and a persevering spirit. This culture 
encourages entrepreneurs to contribute to this trusting and supportive environment while also striving to 
excel and generate results. Based on this reflective analysis, our findings suggest that the context defining 
startups pursuing digital innovation is “dynamic and flexible enough to allow individuals to use their own 
judgment as to how they divide their time between alignment-oriented and adaptation-oriented activities, 
and both are valued and rewarded” (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 211). Additionally, this context enables 
startup members to determine when to reach out to their surrounding ecosystem to access and enact the 
required competencies. 
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Figure 3. Achieving Ambidexterity in Startups via Enacting Key Competencies 
Therefore, this reflective analysis reveals that, in general, startups dealing with digital innovation manage 
to behave ambidextrously via enacting eight key competencies that their CEO, startup team members, or 
individuals in the surrounding ecosystem provide. This enactment occurs via these individuals’ using key 
competencies for exploratory and exploitative tasks, respectively. Figure 3 depicts this relationship. 
6 Discussion and Future Directions 
In this paper, we investigate how startups pursuing digital innovation can manage ambidexterity. In this 
section, we discuss our findings in relation to the existing ambidexterity literature and, thus, accentuate our 
contributions and their limitations while also proposing areas of ambidexterity research that require further 
investigation. 
With this paper, we extend Volery et al.’s (2013) observation of entrepreneurs’ everyday exploration-
exploitation behavior. Whereas they identify six behavioral ambidexterity patterns, we identify the 
competencies that allow these entrepreneurs—in the words of Volery et al. (2013)—to juggle different roles 
in order to navigate the tension between exploration and exploitation. Researchers have previously 
investigated some of these competencies (e.g., “enterprising” in the form of leadership skills) (Schoemaker, 
Krupp, & Howland, 2013), although not in the startup context. Moreover, in contrast to Cragg et al. (2011) 
who identify IS competencies at the organizational level, we help to explain the portfolio of competencies at 
the individual level that startups need to access and enact to achieve organizational ambidexterity. We draw 
on Feeny and Willcocks’ (1998a, 1998b) framework in defining and analyzing competencies. Whereas 
Feeny and Willcocks examine the core IS capabilities (which constitute the multiple competencies and skill 
sets that enable organizations to successfully manage the supply and demand for IS/IT services) for 
exploiting information technology, we take a broader ambidexterity perspective. We recognize the dual 
imperative of managing exploitation and exploration in both startups and established organizations, and we 
investigate how startups perform both explorative and exploitative tasks by enacting key competencies in 
their portfolio. This competency enactment allows them to achieve ambidexterity. Thus, our study extends 
Feeny and Willcocks’ (1998a, 1998b) research and other exponents of the resource-based view (RBV) of 
the firm by investigating how startups can combine competencies in a portfolio and leverage them in 
pursuing competing concerns. In terms of competency portfolio, our conceptualization resembles that of 
Stratman and Roth (2002) who, in an ERP context approach, conceptualize it as a portfolio of skills and 
expertise. While Kuckertz et al. (2010) establish the link between ambidextrous strategic management and 
firm performance, our study shows how startups enact competencies as portfolios to effect ambidextrous 
behavior. Beckman (2006) examines the antecedents of exploration, exploitation, and organizational 
ambidexterity and concludes that “exploring and exploiting may require management teams to draw on 
members’ common and unique affiliations” (p. 753). Our investigation not only corroborates this finding but 
also demonstrates the importance of access to key competencies at the management (the CEO), team, and 
ecosystem levels. Our research reveals how startups can enact their competency portfolio of eight key 
competencies to execute both explorative and exploitative tasks and, thus, make this competency 
enactment a means to achieve ambidexterity. Through assessing the tasks at hand, they can ascertain the 
appropriate enactment of competencies that either the CEO, startup team members, or individuals in the 
ecosystem provide. Consequently, startups manage to balance their exploitative and explorative efforts. In 
doing so, we answer the call for empirical studies of entrepreneurs’ ambidextrous behavior (Mueller et al., 
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2012), team startups (Brem, 2017), and research on how to resolve the challenges of creating “a 
combinatory mindset within the firm” (Parida et al., 2016, p. 1158). The open-minded, supportive, and result-
oriented context that constitutes the environment in which startups access their competency portfolio helps 
them to attain ambidexterity in this way. Accordingly, despite the fact that startups have scarce resources 
and limited in-house competencies, they can still behave ambidextrously since they have access to a 
competency portfolio that crosses organizational boundaries, which means that they can combine 
competencies via internal and external stakeholders’ contributions. This finding that shows the surrounding 
ecosystem to be an equally important contributing factor in achieving organizational ambidexterity 
represents a novel contribution to state-of-the-art knowledge. With the exception of Raisch et al. (2009), the 
existing ambidexterity literature has focused on how to achieve ambidexterity through different ways of 
arranging internal resources and work processes—whether through structural separation, contextual 
factors, or leadership action (Adler et al., 1999; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Smith & 
Tushman, 2005). Consequently, we broaden our understanding of ambidexterity with this research in finding 
that startups involve their surrounding ecosystem when balancing exploitation and exploration efforts. 
Based on this finding, we suggest that researchers explore further how corporations, or business units in 
corporations, can attain ambidexterity by leveraging the environment in which they exist. 
However, our findings also support Gibson and Birkinshaw’s (2004) findings and, thus, accentuate the 
importance of the elements of stretch, discipline, trust, and support for startups when they establish a 
context facilitating ambidexterity. Therefore, our study emphasizes that these factors are just as important 
in startups as in the business units of large corporations where researchers originally discovered them, 
though our research also reveals that the facilitating context spans the surrounding ecosystem of Silicon 
Valley. Therefore, the way of achieving ambidexterity that we outline relies on the facilitating context to span 
both the startup and the surrounding environment. Moreover, our findings highlight the importance of the 
CEO’s leadership style when it comes to creating a favorable context in which ambidexterity can thrive. The 
CEO may nurture such a context by enacting the empowerment competency. This finding resembles Gibson 
and Birkinshaw’s (2004, p. 223) emphasizing “the important role played by senior executives in making an 
organization context effective and developing ambidexterity”. 
In addition, our findings reveal that startups can achieve ambidexterity through enacting competencies in 
two ways: either through the “leader-centric” model (which features an ambidextrous CEO who orchestrates 
the startup team members’ activities and involves individuals in the ecosystem) or through the “team-centric” 
model (which features all startup team members’ acting ambidextrously and, thus, coordinating and 
balancing their own tasks). Accordingly, both approaches imply ambidextrous individuals. However, the 
question about whether individuals can actually excel at both exploitation and exploration due to their 
different personalities and preferences remains (Gupta et al., 2006). In this study, we could not assess 
performance quality when the CEO and startup team members both performed exploitative and explorative 
tasks. We can conclude only that both startup team members and CEOs executed both kinds of tasks and 
assessed for themselves how to balance their efforts and, thereby, characterize them as ambidextrous 
individuals. As such, we encourage future research to assess the quality of performance of ambidextrous 
individuals and measure if they perform exploitative and explorative tasks equally well. 
Finally, we propose that ambidexterity is a state of acting that manifests itself via a startup’s enacting the 
competency portfolio available to it. This finding opposes the findings of Tarafdar and Gordon (2007) who, 
in their study of competencies that support innovation processes, define ambidexterity as an obtainable 
competency along with others such as “project management” and “process modeling” (Tarafdar & Gordon, 
2007). Their perspective implies that an organization possesses ambidexterity internally (i.e., that business 
units or organizations are ambidextrous if they possess that particular competency). However, based on 
our findings, we argue that ambidexterity results from startups’ enacting a portfolio of competencies and 
does not represent a competency in itself. 
6.1 Limitations 
Our research helps to explain how, by enacting competencies, startups pursuing digital innovation can attain 
organizational ambidexterity. Accordingly, we focus on ambidexterity in this study, while the competency 
literature functions as a particular perspective that provides an enriched understanding of ambidexterity. 
Due to our study’s scope, we do not examine the broader perspectives of the competency literature. As we 
mention above, we also relied on qualitative data from startups that participated in the SCALEit program. 
However, using such data constitutes an empirical limitation since our empirical data foundation comprises 
only contributions from startups that the met certain variables that the SCALEit program requires. 
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Consequently, we recognize that our sample represents just one sample of startups conducting digital 
innovation. Additionally, we observed the SCALEit program throughout the one-week program and 
conducted the interviews over the course of that week. From the interviews and observations, we came to 
better understand the day-to-day operations in the startups; however, our empirical data does not contain 
actual observations of the startups’ day-to-day operations since the participants did not work in their natural 
working environment for the duration of the SCALEit program. Finally, we acknowledge that our sample 
featured a disproportionate number of CEOs, which limits our empirical data in the sense that it might have 
biased our findings. However, we took care to ask the participating CEOs to explain in detail their team 
members’ activities, roles, and contributions. With that said, we encourage researchers to conduct future 
studies of startup teams in their natural working environment. 
6.2 Implications for Practitioners 
Based on the insights we gained from our research, we propose several suggestions for practitioners. First, 
to achieve ambidexterity, startups pursuing digital innovation should make sure that their competency 
portfolio provides access to all eight key competencies we found. On account of this access, they will be 
able to enact all of the competencies to simultaneously perform exploitative and explorative activities as 
needed. Second, startups should keep in mind that the constitution of the competency portfolio does not 
need to rely solely on individuals in the startup since advisors, investors, mentors, and others in the 
surrounding ecosystem can also contribute with competencies. Accordingly, we suggest that business unit 
leaders and enterprise CEOs consider the surrounding ecosystem as an active part of their competency 
portfolio. Third, to proactively manage challenges that engender a startup’s progress, we suggest mapping 
the competencies available in house and through external providers to gain insight into the missing 
competencies. Startups can use this map of missing competencies for directions with regard to which 
competencies to look for when expanding the advisory network or hiring new employees. Investors can also 
use a map of a startup’s current competencies to assess if the current startup team is too “inbred” (as one 
investor termed it), which means that startups that have mastered only some of the eight key competencies 
will need to spend time and money filling up the competency portfolio by expanding their team and network. 
Finally, our research suggests that startup CEOs who wish to attain ambidexterity by leveraging their startup 
team of ambidextrous individuals will have to focus on creating an enabling context. 
7 Conclusion 
With this research, we help to explain how startups pursuing digital innovation manage to attain 
organizational ambidexterity in hypercompetitive global markets. Through a multiple case study of startups 
affiliated with the entrepreneurial accelerator program SCALEit, we found that these startups achieve 
organizational ambidexterity by enacting eight key competencies: digital product development, enterprising, 
envisioning, business orchestration, commercialization, networking, empowerment, and perseverance. In 
their totality, these key competencies constitute a competency portfolio available to the startups. By enacting 
the appropriate competencies, the startups could simultaneously perform both explorative and exploitative 
tasks and, thus, achieve ambidexterity. Moreover, we found how the startups’ CEO, team members, and 
individuals in their surrounding ecosystem provided the eight key competencies, which suggests that the 
startups had access to a competency portfolio that crossed organizational boundaries. Further, the startups 
could leverage this competency portfolio due to the open-minded, supportive, and result-oriented context 
that constituted the environment in which the startups existed. In this regard, our research shows that a 
startup’s CEO’s leadership style and behavior constitutes an important factor in facilitating an organizational 
context that supports startup team members in judging for themselves how to divide their time between 
exploitative and explorative activities and in evaluating when to involve external competencies. Even though 
startups pursuing digital innovation typically feature scarce resources, our study concludes that they 
manage to attain organizational ambidexterity by combining and enacting internal and external 
competencies in their portfolio to perform both exploitative and explorative tasks. 
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